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Virtues, vices and place attachment  
Mihi: Introduction - Who am I? 
Tēnā koutou katoa  
Ko Opuke te Maunga  
Ko Ōtākaro te awa 
Nō Ōtautahi ahau 
Ko Parker tōku whānau 
Ko Carolyn Mason tōku ingoa 
Tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou, tēnā tatou katoa 
Hello to you all 
Mount Hutt is my mountain 
The Avon is my river 
I am from Christchurch 
The Parkers are my family 
My name is Carolyn Mason 
Greetings, Greetings, Greetings to us all 
Kia ora tātou 
This first introduction is a modified form of a traditional Maori mihimihi – an introduction that 
explains my relationship to the mountains, bodies of water, land, and places that surround us all. 
This form of introduction helps other people to understand who I am by explaining the environment 
that helps make me who I am. Maori tend to name the mountains, water and land that their 
ancestors are associated with, thus, in a sense, making the introduction a statement of their families’ 
relationship to places as well as their own relationship to places. 
Ko Te Poho-o-Tamatea te pukepuke te rū nei taku ngākau. 
Ko Ōtākaro te awa e mahea nei aku māharahara. 
Nō Ōtautahi ahau 
E mihi ana ki ngā tohu o nehe, o Waitaha e noho nei au. 
Ko Ngāti Pākehā te iwi 
Ko Carolyn Mason tōku ingoa 
Tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou katoa 
(Baxter, 2020) 
Hello everyone 
The Port Hills are the hills that speak to my heart. 
The Avon is the river that alleviates my worries. 
I am from Christchurch 
I recognise the ancestral and spiritual landmarks of Canterbury where I live. 
I am pakeha [my ancestors are colonisers of Aoteraoa New Zealand] 
My name is Carolyn Mason 
Greetings to everyone 
The second introduction is an example of a pakeha – an immigrant to New Zealand – playing with 
this traditional form of introduction to help it express his relationship to the places that surround us. 
His intent was to take account of Maori tikanga (cultural values) when he did this. 
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For Maori, this introduction is a way for people to understand the identity of the people they meet. 
But, although many people try to establish where a person comes from early in their interactions, 
the importance of place to identity is seldom acknowledged by people who are not indigenous. And, 
whether relationships to places matter to who we are as people is seldom discussed by 
philosophers. 
What am I doing? 
After the earthquakes, many people left Christchurch. Some felt a sense of loss when they left, and 
some people who remained in Christchurch felt as though the city and its people were betrayed by 
those who left when it wasn't clear that they had a good reason to leave. (Good reasons included 
things like having nowhere to live or extreme anxiety.) People who remained often expressed a 
commitment to, and sense of belonging to, the city that lasted long after the earthquakes ended.  
For a long time Amy wanted to leave Christchurch, and join her mother and brother in 
Brisbane – she and her husband even put their house up for sale. But as the move drew 
closer, it felt wrong, says Amy – “like running away.” 
Her husband is a builder: “Part of his healing was to fix the city.” But Amy realised that she 
wanted to be a part of that, too. “That was the point I committed to Christchurch… and 
weaving my recovery story into the rebuild.” 
Now Amy loves the city in a way she never did before. She likens it to the Māori concept of 
kotahitanga, of feeling connected and acting collectively. (Hunt, 2021) 
This led me to wonder about connections to places, and the values and ethics associated with our 
connection to places.  
Maori culture teaches us the importance of a particular kind of connection to places – and I will say 
more about this later. Indigenous people from other, very different, places and climates also 
explicitly acknowledge the importance of their connections to places to who they are as individuals 
and as a people (Bhattacharyya et al., 2012). Moreover, research into the relatively new field of 
place attachment gives additional support to the importance of this relationship (Hidalgo & 
Hernandez, 2001; Low & Altman, 1992; Scannell & Gifford, 2017; Tuan, 2012; Twigger-Ross & Uzzell, 
1996).  
What is a place? 
Geographers sometimes use ‘place’ to refer to spaces to which people have a meaningful connection 
(Fullilove, 1997; Tuan, 2012). To use the word in this way here would beg the question; it would 
assume answers to some of the questions investigated here. When used here, ‘place’ simply refers 
to a place. That could be a room, a house, a boat, a forest, a lake, or a bay. A place is not just a 
location, it is also the things in that location. Place, in the sense it is used here, might not be able to 
be an island (unless it was small) or a country, because it is hard to have a relationship with, in the 
sense of interacting with, a large thing, whether that is a large group of friends or an ocean. 
Do we value places? 
We clearly do not, and I have just suggested, cannot value all places. But, the answer to the question 
“Do individuals sometimes attach value to some places?” is clearly “yes”.  
The video by geographer Joseph Kerski, transcribed below, explains the concept of place and love of 
place and it expresses his experiences of valuing a place. 
Hi there let's chat for a moment about something called topophilia it's what geographer Yi 
Foo Tuan called the love of place and this particular place [a riverside surrounded by trees, 
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shrubs and grasses] I definitely have topophilia for. Think about the places that you love. 
What are the sights, the sounds, the smells, the memories, the climate, the vegetation, the 
landforms, the people around you, or the lack of people around you? What are the things 
that make it special? Well geography has lots of facets to it, but one of the key facets is a 
keen interest in place. Now I don't mean just location when I say place. What I mean is all 
the things that I described the things that give it its unique characteristics that we as humans 
can appreciate. The animals, the plants, the water, or lack of water. In this case, I've got this 
beautiful Saint Croix River behind me that gives this particular place lots of distinctive 
characteristics. Let's just pause for a moment and listen. You … can hear birds, you can hear 
this this stream running into the main river from a spring that's up the hill, a bit anyway. All 
of these things combine to give it a unique character and these are the kinds of things that 
draw us to the concept of place. And in geography we can actually study place, not just as 
how they exist now and how we feel about them, but how - there' some geese coming over 
– but how they change over time and also how we can protect special places that we love 
through action. So topophilia, it's a great concept…. (Kerski, 2012) 
Figure 1. The Saint Croix River (Kerski, 2012) 
 
What is “place attachment”? 
When I speak about valuing places I am, of course, referring to attaching positive value to places. 
The terms “topophilia” and “place attachment”, which are commonly used in geography, refer to 
this kind of attachment to a place. Geographer Yi-Fu Tuan devised the term “topophilia”, which 
literally means, love of place, to refer to a strong positive affective bond with a place (Tuan & 
Winchell, 1974). Place attachment has been described as “a positive affective bond between an 
individual and a specific place, the main characteristic of which is the tendency of the individual to 
maintain closeness to such a place” (Hidalgo & Hernandez, 2001, p. 274). Others, however, suggest 
that place attachment may sometimes be a negative affective bond, and may be a bond between 
groups and their environment as well as between individuals and their environment (Low & Altman, 
1992). 
Should we value places? 
That we value places and become attached to them is interesting, and we need to take into account 
when investigating our relationship to places, but it says nothing about whether we should value 
places. People do sometimes attach value to things that make their lives worse, and sometimes they 
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value those things even when they understand that they are detrimental to them, whether that is 
because what they value has bad consequences for them or others, or because what they value has 
bad effects on their actions or character. 
The claim that we should value a place means, at its most basic, that places should matter to us. 
“Mattering” can mean as little as that we accept that there is a prima facie reason to consider the 
effect of our actions on the place and accept that in some circumstances our actions should not 
harm that place. 
It seems clear that there are instrumental reasons for us to value places. (Some environmental 
ethicists have argued that there are also intrinsic reasons for valuing places, but this position is 
stronger than needed for the arguments made here about virtues and vices, so arguments for this 
position are not discussed here.) The image and quote below are one blatant example.  
Figure 2. The winner of the 2010 New Zealand “Smells Kitchen” Competition
 
Speaking from under a mountain of dishes, Turnbull said the house now had a seventh 
flatmate, a friendly rat. A hole had also developed in the roof of his bedroom that had 
leaked, destroying his laptop and disabling the lights. The house could get cold in winter, 
with only the oven used for heating, he said. (Cowlishaw, 2010) 
These university students do not have a lot of money. Caring for the place they live in would save the 
cost and educational consequences that follow from a destroyed laptop. Caring for the house will 
also benefit their health. So, if we assume that their health or their education do, or should, matter 
to them, then the place they live should matter enough to them for them to “take out the trash”. So, 
they have an instrumental reason to value the place they live.  
Should we value our relationships to places? 
For there to be a virtue associated with place attachment, it needs to be the case that people should 
both value some place or places, and that they should value their relationships to places. Asking 
whether we should value our relationship to some place or places is not the same as asking whether 
we should value some places, just as asking whether we should value our relationships to people is 
not the same as asking whether we should value some people.  
If “valuing a place” means accepting that one has a prima facie reason to consider how one’s actions 
might negatively affect that place, a person can value a place without valuing their relationship to 
that place. For example, the university student in the last example could have an instrumental 
reason to value the flat he lives in without having a reason to value his relationship to that flat. He 
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would presumably be happy to move into a flat next door if someone did all the work for him and 
the conditions there were the same. And, perhaps there is no good reason for him to value his 
relationship to the particular place in which he will live for a year or two.  
Similarly, it is possible to value one’s relationship to a place without valuing that place. Landowners 
who value what they can get out of a place rather than valuing the place itself, for example, the Rio 
Tinto mining company in Australia, should value their relationship to that place, for without that 
relationship, they will not be able to access the resources that they need to survive as a company.  (I 
am, perhaps, being unwise here to discuss a company valuing a place rather than individuals valuing 
a place, but the argument that individuals should value their relationships to some places would be 
the same.) 
One of the aims of the next sections of this presentation is to show that we should value our 
relationships to at least some places.  
Virtues and vices 
The aim here is to give a neo-Aristotelian account of a virtue of place attachment. This task is more 
difficult and more controversial than it may seem. When writing about virtues and environmental 
ethics, Rosalind Hursthouse comments that “the introduction—or discovery—of a new virtue is a 
formidable task” (Hursthouse, 2007, p. 160). One reason the task is formidable is that which 
characteristics are virtues has been debated for thousands of years.  
Figure 3. ‘Pallas Expelling Vices from the Garden of Virtues’ by Andrea Mantegna 
 
However, my arguments here assume that there are virtues that are not on any list, because they 
are not yet recognised as virtues. The virtues most commonly considered within philosophy are 
those from the Greek philosophical traditions or Christianity. This reflects where academic theories 
developed. This project involves looking outside those dominant philosophical traditions. This does 
not mean that this is a work of comparative philosophy. Rather, the discussion of place attachment 
draws on indigenous knowledge to help reveal the importance of our relationships with places to 
our flourishing, and uses information from Maori cultural practices to help reveal what a virtue of 




What is meant by “virtue”? 
On a neo-Aristotelian account, virtues are character traits, ingrained dispositions that affect what a 
person believes and desires and the way a person perceives, experiences, and acts towards the 
world (Hursthouse, 1999, pp. 11-12). Being an ingrained disposition is not sufficient for a character 
trait to be a virtue. Vices are ingrained dispositions too! However, unlike vices, virtues reliably 
contribute to a person’s flourishing (Hursthouse, 1999, pp. 9-10, 167-170; McKinnon, 1999, pp. 26, 
153). Being virtuous contributes to flourishing because acting virtuously increases the chance of 
having positive experiences, but acting virtuously is also part of what it is to live a flourishing life, just 
as playing the piano well is can be part of what it is to music. Being virtuous is not, however, a 
guarantee that a person will flourish, because external conditions also affect people’s ability to 
flourish.  
For a character trait to be a virtue, children need to be born with an ability to develop that character 
trait (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 251; 2007, pp. 160-161). However, even though people learn virtues from 
others, being virtuous involves choosing to develop and maintain a character trait because it will 
help you become who you want to be (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 136). In other words, being virtuous 
involves valuing the virtues.  
To illustrate what it is for a character trait to be a virtue, consider the virtue of generosity. Someone 
with this virtue will have a number of characteristics.  First, it will be a reliable character trait. The 
generous person can be relied on to act with generosity when this is appropriate. The generous 
person will believe that there are circumstances where people should act generously. But they will 
have other beliefs, for example, they will not believe that those towards whom they act generously 
are lesser people or believe that generosity must be repaid. The generous person will also want to 
act generously. And they will have desires that relate to any person they act generously towards. For 
example, they will want to improve the lives of the hungry. The generous person will also experience 
emotions that will help them identify when generosity is called for and what generosity requires. For 
example, they may empathise with another person’s situation, empathise with another person’s 
feelings about being the beneficiary of a generous act, and feel good about being generous, or feel 
annoyed when they think about giving more than they can give and still flourish. The generous 
person will perceive when generosity is called for and when an act of giving is not a virtuous act. 
When the generous person acts, these different aspects of their disposition to be generous will help 
them determine what generosity requires, and that generosity will contribute to the virtue-holder’s 
flourishing, for example, by helping them develop good relationships with others, and through the 
increase in wellbeing that has now been shown to flow from certain kinds of acts of giving (Marks & 
Shah, 2004).  
My claim is that the features of the disposition of generosity that make it a virtue are shared by a 
virtue of place attachment.  
Ahikā:  virtuous place attachment 
The Māori term “ahi kā” literally means keeping fire burning; it refers to the continuous occupation 
of a piece of land by an iwi (tribe) or hapu (kinship group).  “Continuous occupation” does not mean 
constant occupation; it means consistent occupation, reliably being at and interacting with a place 
over a period of time. For Māori, as for many other indigenous people, continuous occupation of a 
piece of land by gave that group the right to use that land.  
Te Horetā Te Taniwha commented about one area of land: “Our tribe was living there at that 
time. We did not live there as our permanent home, but were there according to our custom 
of living for some time on each of our blocks of land, to keep our claim to each, and that our 
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fire might be kept alight on each block, so that it might not be taken from us by some other 
tribe. (John White, 1887, cited in Meredith, 2008). 
But, as will be mentioned soon, being the occupiers of the land meant more than living there.  
I use “ahikā” as the term for virtuous place attachment. In this I somewhat follow Acushla O’Carroll, 
who writes, “ahikā has become a term used for the people who keep the metaphorical and literal 
home fires burning; those who are keeping things functioning at the coalface of hapū (sub-tribe) and 
iwi [tribe] communities” (O’Carroll, 2013, p. 442). It is this disposition and practice of working to 
“keep the metaphorical and literal home fires burning” that I argue is a virtue.  
Developing ahikā 
If there is a neo-Aristotelian virtue associated with ahi kā, then that virtue can be, and ought to be, 
developed in children and adults. Aristotle points out that virtues are product of nature and nurture: 
“the virtues arise in us neither by nature nor against nature. Rather, we are by nature able to acquire 
them and reach our complete perfection through habit” (1985, 1103a24-25). Human beings have the 
capacity to form the attachments necessary for a virtue such as ahikā: we know that people, 
including children, commonly come to feel emotionally connected to particular places (Chawla, 
1992, pp. 66-69, 83; Marcus, 1992; Scannell & Gifford, 2017, p. 359). Nurture can help develop such 
connections. First, the standard approaches to teaching and learning virtues will also succeed with 
ahikā: exhibiting the kinds of desires, affect, and perceptions explained here, and making apparent 
the ways in which the virtue supports flourishing. Children and adults learn by example. The practice 
of burying a child’s placenta in a place that is special to the family, and raising the child to know that 
their placenta lies in that place, teaches a child that there is a link between that place and their 
family as well as strengthening that link (Abel et al., 2001, p. 1142; Jones & Kay 2003, p. 112). In 
Aotearoa New Zealand, school children are taught to introduce themselves as I did at the start, by 
identifying the mountain, river or lake, and place to which they are affiliated or to which they feel 
they belong. This practice encourages children to think about their relationship to the environment 
that is part of their personal history as well as giving them the ability to verbally express a place-
identity.  




However, more than this connection to a place is necessary for developing ahikā. Kenneth Olwig 
argues that for children to develop a sense of place, they must: “[understand] the processes shaping 
… [their] environment, and [develop a] … sense of personal concern … [that will lead them to take] 
an active interest in the future of … [their] environment (Owlig, 1982, cited in Chawla, 1992, p. 83). 
Elements of this understanding and active interest are discussed later, and these can be developed 
through parenting, education and involving children in socio-cultural practices. For example, 
research on education and the environment shows that listening to stories can help children 
understand nature (Tooth & Renshaw, 2009, pp. 99-101; Yılmaz et al., 2020). Place-based education 
has also been shown to improve children’s understanding of, attachment to, and sense of 
responsibility for their local environment (Sobel, 2004).  
Of course, showing that place attachment can be learnt does not show that ahikā is a virtue, but it 
does show that if there is such a virtue, it can be developed.  
Ahikā, perception and action 
Ahikā affects people’s perceptions of the places to which they are connected, their perceptions of 
themselves (that is, their self-identity), and their perception of their responsibilities. Ahikā could 
involve many different kinds of relationship to a place, and the nature of the relationship with a 
place will affect the perceptions a person with ahikā has of that place and affect the actions that will 
count as virtuous. So, the perceptions and actions associated with ahikā will be context dependent, 
just as the perceptions associated with generosity are affected by variations in the situation, 
relationships, and people’s roles.  
Relationships that people with ahikā could have to places include connections to a place that one’s 
family has lived in or holidayed at for a long time, connections to a regularly visited forest or place of 
worship, or a connection to a place that one has come to as an adult immigrant with the intention of 
making one’s home. Each of these different relationships will generate different perceptions and 
actions.  
Ahi kā, the practice from which I have adopted the term ‘ahikā’, is associated with a continuous 
connection to a place where one’s family has lived for generations. If a consistent and significant link 
between family and place has been maintained for generations, this land will have been cared for by 
family members and have been a source of sustenance to their family for generations. Those with 
the virtue of the ahikā will perceive the land to be an important part of their identity. Those without 
a deep connection to a place may fail to understand the nature or importance of this relationship.  
People may also form virtuous attachments to a place that their extended family or community has 
not been associated with. Someone with ahikā who has gone hunting in an area since childhood will 
feel a close bond to the area and be able to see aspects of the place that most others will not. For 
example, they may detect environmental damage to the area that others lack the knowledge to 
identify. Similarly, someone with the virtue of ahikā who has lived in a town for years will see 
valuable features of that town that others may not be able to see. They may, for example, see 
beauty, interesting features and interesting information in the local cemetery that enables them to 
give cemetery tours to help others see ways in which the place is special.  
Someone with the virtue of ahikā will see themselves as having a responsibility to care for the place 
with which they feel a bond because they value that place are aware of its characteristics and its 
state. For example, social psychiatrist Mindy Fullilove argues that “place attachment” involves a 
“mutual caretaking bond between a person and a beloved place” (Fullilove, 1997, p. 1516). This 
aspect of ahikā is consistent with indigenous relationships to land and consistent with place 
attachment. For example, the Māori concept of ahi kā, of maintaining one’s connection with a place, 
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is associated with kaitiakitanga, guardianship or stewardship of that place (Kawharu, 2000; 
Moorfield, 2011; Simmonds et al., 2016, p. 82; Warne, 2018).  
Te ahi kā is about valuing the land and having the right kind of relationship with the land as well as 
about having authority over the land. The Māori concepts of “mana whenua”, authority over land 
and “kaitiakitanga”, guardianship or stewardship, are closely tied to ahi kā (Moorfield, 2011). Tina 
Ngata, claims that “kaitiakitanga is inseparable from ahi kaa” (Warne, 2018). Merata Kawha draws 
similar links: “Maintaining ahi ka assured (mana whenua) rights of a particular kin group to 
implement all forms of kaitiakitanga within a designated territory”(Kawharu, 2000, p. 362, italics in 
original; see also Simmonds et al., 2016, p. 82). Kaitiakitanga involves valuing the land, not just 
accepting that one has a responsibility to care for the land (or air or water). The Tsilhqot'in also take 
their relationship with the lands where they keep fires burning to incorporate guardianship. In “It's 
who we are: Locating cultural strength in relationship with the land”, the authors write: “The 
relationship that people have with the land in the present is an expression of their past and future in 
that place” (Bhattacharyya et al., 2012, p. 216). Those interviewed describe themselves as 
“caretakers” and discuss the importance of protecting the land (pp. 215-216) and treating the land 
with respect (Bhattacharyya et al., 2012, pp. 216-218). There are differences in attitudes and actions 
between these cultures, but the core ideas overlap, and it is these core ideas that are associated 
with the virtue of ahikā.  
Figure 5. Know my place: Kaitiakitanga, Galatea School Poster 
 
The perceptions and actions associated with ahikā are strongly related to desires and emotions 
associated with ahikā, just as the perceptions and actions associated with generosity are strongly 
related to desires and emotions associated with generosity. Consider trying to feel proud of, 
rejoicing in, or wanting to maintain a connection to a place that one has not taken care of, that one 
has, for example, polluted or allowed to become polluted. People with the virtue of ahikā will, 
therefore, see ways in which the place to which they have a bond needs to be altered or protected. 
They will reflect on the ways in which their actions and the actions of others could, or have, affected 
a place. They will, for example, be wary of acting in a way that will harm a place for the sake of 
short-term profit.  
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Environmental psychologists Proshansky et al., call this kind of perceptiveness towards a particular 
environment “environmental understanding” and “environmental competence” (1983, p. 72). 
According to Proshansky et al., people with environmental understanding and competence “[know] 
what’s ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ with the physical setting and what has to be done to bring about change in 
it” (Proshansky et al., 1983, p. 70). Although Proshansky et al. are not discussing ahikā, this 
understanding of a place has the same form as the understanding that comes with this virtue.  
Needless to say, someone could be able to see that a place is being destroyed, say through erosion, 
without knowing how to protect land or water affected by that erosion. However, someone with 
ahikā will notice the erosion and be motivated to learn whether it is harmful or a natural feature of a 
place and learn how to protect that environment.  
Ahikā affect and desires 
As mentioned above, place attachment is an affective bond, so, like other virtues, ahikā will be 
associated with certain kinds of emotions and desires (Hidalgo & Hernandez, 2001; Low & Altman, 
1992).  People with the virtue of ahikā will have first- and second-order desires to maintain the 
physical and psychological connection they have to the place with which they have a bond, that is, 
they will want to maintain a connection to that place and want to want to maintain a connection to 
that place. If people with the virtue of ahikā do not have the opportunity to maintain a physical and 
psychological connection to a place to which they have clear and meaningful ties, then they will 
want to identify a place to which they can form a meaningful connection and form and maintain a 
connection to that place. They may, for example, want to develop a connection to a place associated 
with another family member, a religious group, their past experiences, a shared community space, 
or a place that has environmental value.  
If ahikā is indeed a virtue, then those with the virtue will want children who are part of their family 
or community to share this desire to be connected to a particular place, and may feel grief and the 
virtuous may feel a sense of loss when children or community members do not choose to maintain 
this connection. This grief will arise not just because the virtuous want to maintain a connection to 
the next generation and want their community to flourish, but also because they believe that those 
without ahikā lose something important for flourishing.  
As a virtue, ahikā will bring with it a certain set 
of affective responses. These affective 
responses are consistent with the place-
attachment mentioned above, but involve more 
than “a positive affective bond” (Hidalgo & 
Hernandez, 2001, p. 274). As for other virtues, 
affective responses will be context dependent, 
varying with changes in the situation and the 
nature of the relationship between the person 
and the place (Giuliani, 2016). For example, 
ahikā associated with land to which one’s 
family has been linked for centuries will 
produce different affective responses than 
ahikā associated with a place with which one is 
building a new relationship. These affective 
responses may include fondness, pride, distress 
when a place is harmed, feelings of 
responsibility or guardianship towards a place 
As time went by, I also realized that the 
particular place I’d chosen was less 
important than the fact that I’d chosen 
and focused my life around it. Although 
[where I live] has taken on great 
significance for me, it’s no more 
inherently beautiful or meaningful than 
any other place on earth. What makes a 
place special is the way it buries itself 
inside the heart…. Every place, like 
every person, is elevated by the love 
and respect shown toward it, and by 




and perhaps also those in that place. It may involve a feeling that this place is, in a rich sense of the 
word, home; a sense that this place is one’s tūrangawaewae, the place in which one feels one 
belongs, a feeling of being connected to the land, supported by the land, and empowered by that 
connection (Brown, 2014). Just as the virtuous person’s perceptions and beliefs will affect their 
emotions and desires, the virtuous person’s affective responses will alter their perception of the 
land and what they feel called to do in response to events on the land.  
Virtues are sometimes described as involving the proper regulation of particular affective states. For 
example, courage involves the proper regulation of and response to fear (Aristotle & Irwin, 1985, 
1115a6-10) and temperance involves the proper regulation of and response to pleasure (Aristotle & 
Irwin, 1985, 1117b21-26). It might be claimed that this shows that ahikā is not a virtue, as ahikā does 
not involve the proper regulation of and response to a particular emotion. However, not even all 
Aristotelian virtues have this association with the regulation of easily identified, distinct emotions. 
Although there are emotions associated with, for example, generosity, justice and proper ambition, 
associating these virtues with distinct emotional states would fail to capture what they involve 
emotionally and cognitively. Similarly, ahikā can be a virtue without being associated with the proper 
regulation of a particular affective state. 
Vices associated with ahikā 
Aristotle claims that virtues are often the mean between a vice of excess and a vice of deficiency. For 
example, for generosity, there is a vice of deficiency, where you give too little, and a vice of excess, 
where you give too much. Like most Aristotelian virtues, there are two vices associated with the 
virtue ahikā, a vice of deficiency and a vice of excess.  
Figure 6. Virtues as a mean between two vices 
 
For ahikā, the vice of deficiency involves a failure to form and maintain the right kind of relationship 
with the land, this may be failing to form a relationship with a place, forming a relationship with a 
place that is too weak to promote flourishing. (The lack of an easily accessible name to refer to the 
virtues and vices associated with ahikā is not a reason for doubting that there are such virtues and 
vices. Aristotle had the same problem when he searched for names to associate with virtues and 
vices. See, in particular,  the unnamed virtues in Nicomachean Ethics Book IV (Aristotle & Irwin, 
1985).) For ahikā, the vice of excess involves forming a relationship with a place that is too strong or 
rigid to be conducive to flourishing. Or a vice of excess could involve forming a relationship with the 
wrong place, just as it would the vice of being overgenerous involves giving generously to the wrong 
person. 
Synonyms for the term “rootless” are typically negative. Those who lack ahikā cannot flourish 
because they lack the engagement, meaning and self-esteem that, I argue below, comes from 
virtuous place attachment. Of course there are other ways that engagement, meaning and self-
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esteem can occur, but place attachment has been shown to be one important contributor to these 
things. 
Figure 7. Synonyms for “rootless” 
 
The vice of deficiency associated with ahikā damages relationships with people as well as limiting the 
life of the person who lacks the virtue. A post on Facebook for Ruataniwha Marae illustrates, first, 
the expectation that one person has about a situation where someone fails to have a sufficiently 
strong relationship with a place and, scond, the way in which a deficiency of ahikā can harm 
relationships. 
Something to think about... there are 3 types of Ahi... 
Ahikaaroa - those living at home keeping the home fires burning at the marae 
Ahi tere - those who live away from home but go home to help at the marae when possible 
Ahi Mātao - those who have left home and don't return to put a wood on the fire every now 
and then so their flame has gone cold. 
Which one are you? It's interesting to see whānau when we have tangi at the marae and our 
marae doesn't have many working at the back, sometimes it's been lucky to be 10 people... 
yet the day of the tangi.. wow.... heaps have come home to be manuhiri and expect to be 
treated like manuhiri!! LoL  
(Ruataniwha Marae Wairoa Hawke's Bay, 2015) 
‘Manuhiri’ are guests, people given access to a place and provided with food and shelter. People 
who are not expected to care for the place, help with the provision of food and shelter, or in any 
other way act as hosts. In this example, the failure of people who have a family connection to a place 
to incorporate that connection in their actions leads to resentment from those whose accept that 
their relationship to the place comes with associated responsibilities. Arguably, this post also 
supports the claim that some people believe there is a virtue of ahikā. If there was no belief that 
people should develop such a virtue, a failure to exhibit the virtue would be less likely to harm 
relationships.  
.A vice of excess associated with ahikā could be an obsession with carrying out acts that tie one to 
the land, trying to force others to maintain a connection to the land which they do not (and ought 
not) feel, unreflectively excluding others from land to which you have ties, or attempting to control 
land to which you have ties by excluding others who have ties to that same piece of land from acting 
as guardians of that land.  
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Clearly, the vice of excess can also damage relationships with people as well as harming the person 
who lacks the virtue. This damage is somewhat analogous to the harm caused when someone is too 
possessive in a relationship with another person and prevents that person from forming other 
valuable relationships and limits their own ability to flourish through forming other relationships, or 
when someone works hard to form a relationship with the wrong person, again harming their own 
and the other person's ability to flourish. 
A vice of excess may also lead a person to form – or try to form – relationships with too many places, 
which will lessen their ability to properly maintain their links to any place. The person will lack a 
depth of understanding of the place to understand how to care for it well, and will lack time to 
properly invest in the place and the relationship with the place.  
Tragedies have resulted from people exhibiting behaviour that resembles ahikā, that is, from people 
fighting to maintain their connection to a place to which they have a bond. Whatever position you 
hold on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the cost in death, disability and restrictions on life are 
incompatible with flourishing. And, however numerous the causes of this conflict, it would be 
disingenuous to ignore the importance to those involved of their historic connections to the land. 
Similarly, attempts to protect ones’ lands from immigrants could be partially driven by the same 
sense of authority over, personal relationship with, and commitment to the land. These cases where 
a failure to possess the virtue of ahikā is a barrier to flourishing can be explained within the 
Aristotelian tradition without giving up the notion that ahi kā is a virtue.  
Figure 8. A cartoon published in the New Zealand Truth showing hostility towards immigrants   
(Cited in Te, 2021) 
 
Ahikā and flourishing 
I argue that, like other neo-Aristotelian virtues, ahikā reliably and nonaccidentally contributes to 
flourishing. To recap, ahikā involves the formation, maintenance and renewal of a particular kind of 
place attachment, where this place attachment is valuable for instrumental and non-instrumental 
reasons.  
When a virtue contributes to flourishing instrumentally it is because exercising that virtue reliably 
creates an environment where people are able to access something needed for well-being in a way 
that does not undermine well-being. For example, ahikā contributes to flourishing instrumentally by 
providing an environment that supports the provision of life-sustaining goods and the formation and 
maintenance of relationships. Historically, people who consistently lived on and cared for a piece of 
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land maintained their, and their families, access to food, water and shelter. Among Māori, those 
who took on the roles that sustained ahi kā maintained their family’s relationship with a place, 
enabling their ability to enjoy and use that land’s resources (Sinclair, 1977). A study of the forcible 
removal of Cheslatta T’En people from their ancestral lands reported that the removal was 
associated with instrumental harms, for example, the loss of access to resources, to the ability to 
hunt, or the ability to live without state support (Windsor & McVey, 2005, pp. 156-157). For many 
people in New Zealand and across the world, maintaining access to resources that came from 
stewardship of a place still contributes to flourishing.  
As with access to resources, virtuous place attachment has historically, and still does, instrumentally 
contribute to the development and formation of personal and community relationships. Whether 
people form a relationship with each other is affected by their proximity and their pursuit of joint 
projects. Ahikā involves a consistent relationship with a place, which often has, as a by-product, a 
consistent relationship with others who are also consistently associated with that place or nearby 
places. But, this is not the only way on which ahikā fosters human connections. Ahikā facilitates 
community building because it contributes to the establishment of groups with a shared concern for 
a place or neighbouring places. It helps one develop an understanding of oneself as part of a group, 
whether large or small, working together for a goal that has joint meaning. When your actions and 
the actions of those with whom you feel a bond have contributed to the maintenance and 
development of a place, this can contribute to a sense of identity, belonging and community. 
 Non-instrumentally, acting with ahikā contributes to flourishing through the maintenance of 
culture, fostering a sense of belonging and meaningfulness, and supporting positive self-esteem and 
autonomy. For example, Leila Scannell and Robert Gifford explore ways in which positive place 
attachment is related to “belonging, control [autonomy], self-esteem, and meaning”, each of which 
fosters well-being (Scannell & Gifford, 2017, p. 362). The information I gave you in the introduction 
about my connection to a mountain, water, and place is part of my ‘pepeha’. A pepeha is a narrative 
expressing the places and people a person is connected to, and when a person knows their pepeha, 
this may improve their wellbeing. For example, Māori who know their pepeha are significantly less 
likely to feel isolated than those who do not, and feeling isolated is “an important factor in mental 
distress” (Russell, 2018). Research on the people’s relationships with places show that disruptions to 
such relationships are correlated with a decline in wellbeing and, conversely, developing place 
attachments is correlated with improved wellbeing. Disruptions to place attachment are associated 
with physical health problems, psychological distress, disruptions to personal identity and personal 
relationships, and poor school and work performance.  
As with all virtues, possessing the virtue will not guarantee that a person flourishes. Even if ahikā 
reliably and nonaccidentally contributes to flourishing, external factors may still interfere with a 
virtuous person’s relationship with a place and, hence, with their flourishing. 
Does it matter whether there is a virtue associated with place attachment? 
If there is a virtue associated with place attachment, this has numerous consequences. Most 
obviously, it follows that we should care about our relationship to at least some places, and we 
should also care about other people’s relationships to places. However, it also affects where we 
should look when someone is not flourishing, the processes put in place to help new migrants to a 
region or country, the harms associated with dispossessing indigenous people of ancestral lands, and 
it adds a virtues useful for environmental ethics. 
The biomedical model of health primarily explains a failure to flourish in terms of an individual’s 
psychological or neurophysiological state. The approach taken by the new public health broadens 
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the areas recognised as affecting a person’s health to include social, cultural, environmental and 
other factors. This is illustrated well by the rainbow model of health developed by Göran Dahlgren 
and Margaret Whitehead (Dahlgren & Whitehead, 1991).  
Figure 9. The Dahlgren-Whitehead rainbow model of health 
 
However, when environmental effects on health are considered by those who adopt the Dahlgren-
Whitehead model, those effects are usually direct rather than associated with relationships. For 
example, population health experts recognise that cycleways increase people’s willingness to cycle, 
and hence improve their physical and mental health (Gutiérrez et al., 2020).  However, this is not the 
same as recognising that people’s relationship with particular places can improve their mental 
health. If the claims made here about ahikā are correct, then if we find that we or those we 
associate with are not flourishing, we should consider their relationship to places as well as, for 
example, the way their environment is affecting them, their relationships to other people, mental 
health diagnoses, or their brain chemistry. 
Although the virtuous contribute to their own flourishing by their possession of the virtues, as 
mentioned above, external factors also affect whether the virtuous will flourish. Consider one 
example. When the connection to a place is broken, people lose more than just access to resources, 
they may also lose one source of their personal identity, a form of connection to their extended 
family, their ancestors and their culture, all of which support wellbeing. When the Mayagna 
community sued the Nicaraguan government to retain land rights, the Judges overseeing the case 
commented on the relationship between flourishing and retaining connections to ancestral land, one 
judge mentioned the “unique bond” indigenous communities have with “ancestral lands”, 
mentioning not only it role in survival, but also its importance for “moral fulfillment” (Mayagna 
(Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2001, Concurring Opinion of Judge Hernán Salgado 
Pesantes, para 3).  Other Judges stated that if the community were dispossessed of their historic 
land, they “would be deprived of practicing, conserving and revitalizing their cultural habits, which 
give a meaning to their own existence, both individual and communitarian” (Mayagna (Sumo) Awas 
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2001, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges A. A. Cançado Trindade, M. 
Pacheco Gómez, and A. Abreu Burelli, para 8). Examples such as this support the claim that 
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relationships with land contribute to flourishing in more ways than by providing sustenance. 
However, they also help illustrate the harm caused by dispossessing people of their ancestral lands.  
It might be thought that those who possess the virtue ahikā will be able to form new relationships to 
new places, just as someone who is generous can be generous to a new person when they can no 
longer be generous to someone who has died. However, even if those with the virtue ahikā are able 
to form relationships to new places, their wellbeing will be harmed. First, and least important, 
forming new relationships takes time. The period during which they are establishing a relationship 
and developing their understanding of the new place, will have reduced opportunities to flourish. 
More importantly, if they have been dispossessed of their ancestral lands, then they have lost a 
relationship that cannot be replaced with anything else. The same area of land with almost identical 
flora and fauna cannot restore the original relationship, nor can any sum of money. This is not 
surprising, nor is it a reason to believe that ahikā is not a virtue. It is an example of the way in which 
differences in context affect virtues mentioned above.  
Whether or not someone possesses the virtue ahikā, communities and states can act in ways that 
will support the development of ahikā or the development of new relationships with places. 
Researchers have demonstrated that there is a correlation between migration and mental health 
problems (Virupaksha et al., 2014). If ahikā is indeed a virtue, then supporting migrants to develop a 
relationship with places near their new residences may improve their flourishing. The support 
offered could be as simple as providing a community garden and supporting migrants to the area to 
become members (Galuszka, 2020).  
Figure 10. “Vanessa Witt, who helped start the Feilding community garden, says getting involved is 
a great way for people to share ideas and make friends” (Galuszka, 2020). 
 
Community gardens help people form the kind of relationship mentioned above, where working 
together on a piece of land helps give a sense of community and joint achievement, but where the 
relationship to the land itself offers the possibility of enriching one’s sense of belonging and identity.  
 It has been argued that if we want to change the way that people treat the environment, we need 
to do more than show people that some ethical theories say that they ought to live sustainably 
(Hursthouse, 2007; Jordan & Kristjánsson, 2017) Being told that you ought to act in some way will 
not on its own develop in you the kind of motivation or habits required for you to act in that way.  
Karen Jordan and Kristján Kristjánsson, for example, criticise other virtue ethics approaches to 
environmental ethics for considering the “human-nature relationship and worldview, [in a way] 
which fails to encompass interconnectedness and the interrelatedness of environmental and social 
issues; or … not [extending] the implications of such a conception to include a more holistic view of 
human flourishing as necessarily situated within nature” (Jordan & Kristjánsson, 2017, p. 1207). I am 
18 
 
not doing that – I am opening the door to a recognition of, and deeper investigation of, ways in 
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